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1. Introduction 
In the context of interactions between nuclear power and society since the mid-twentieth century, 
this report explores various examples of historic, international engagement, informed by a review 
of a range of literature on stakeholder, community and public engagement. The aim of this report 
is to identify a number of core principles that reflect effective and positive engagement and, in turn, 
aspects of poor or ineffective engagement that should be mitigated or avoided during future 
SURJUDPPHV%\LGHQWLI\LQJDVHULHVRIµSULQFLSOHVIRUHQJDJHPHQW¶ZHVHHNWRSURYLGHJXLGDQFH
on future engagement practices and programmes, among both nuclear stakeholders and those in 
other technological fields. We identify principles of engagement that are applicable beyond those 
scenarios involving nuclear power development, and even energy more generally. To define a 
desirable engagement future, it is necessary to understand what principles or values are required 
to ensure fair and equitable engagement. Whilst it is impossible to predict the complexity and 
behaviour of human and social systems, it is possible to elicit the principles or values that have 
contributed significantly to the perception of successful engagement. Authors such as Bond et al. 
(2004) have undertaken similar exercises to this in reviewing and detailing broad principles of public 
participation, part of which involved studying the public engagement approach for assessing 
different decommissioning proposals for Trawsfynnydd Nuclear Power Station in North Wales, U.K. 
The current work seeks to similarly identify principles of effective engagement, but will include the 
historical experiences of various European countries to do so.  
As has been argued in recent energy literature, energy developments which are planned, managed 
and established in institutional governance systems with few or no opportunities for citizen influence 
³LQKHUHQWO\ ODFN VRFLDO MXVWLFH SURFHGXUDO IDLUQHVV DQG XOWLPDWHO\ D VRFLDO OLFHQVH WR RSHUDWH´ 
(Whitton, Brasier et al. 2017: 11). The concept of governance, and of energy governance in 
particular, is one which is of particular relevance to this work, and to the HoNESt project more 
widely, as it explores the opportunities for and responses to public and stakeholder engagement in 
the context of large-scale nuclear energy infrastructure across Europe. For the purposes of our 
work, we refer to and frame our discussions using the second and third dimensions of governance 
LQWKHFRQWH[WRIµHQHUJ\PHJDSURMHFWV¶ as proposed by Sovacool and Cooper (2013). These relate 
to the economics and politics of the governance system (e.g. the coalitions of interest involved in 
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supporting or opposing a megaproject), and the interaction between megaproject technology and 
the variants of social organisation created by it (e.g. whether it is controlling or democratic), 
respectively.  
Prior to any discussion on what IRUPµVXFFHVVIXOHQJDJHPHQW¶PD\WDNH, we explore what the term 
µHQJDJHPHQW¶UHIHUVWRWe begin with a broad review of the academic and grey literature to explore 
definitions and conceptualisations of engagement, before examining detailed country reports so as 
to draw out and identify principles and values which are found to constitute and contribute towards 
perceptions of successful engagement.  
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2. Engagement: a brief literature review 
Noland and Phillips (2010) state WKDWWKHWHUPµHQJDJHPHQW¶GHVFULEHV ³LQWHUDFWLRQWKDWLQYolves, at 
minimum, recognition and respect of common humanity and the ways in which the actions of each 
PD\DIIHFWWKHRWKHU´ (p. 40). Engagement is similar to participation in regards to its broad meaning, 
describing the various ways in which information, views or opinions flow multi-directionally between 
the public and decision-makers (Cass 2006). To clarify, members of the public can be engaged on 
a subject or decision but it does not follow that they will participate in the relevant decision-making 
process in an influential capacity, unless the outcomes of engagement inform the process. In short, 
engagement can lead to participation in decision-making, whereas participation involves 
engagement. 
Building on the early engagement and participation categorisation work of authors such as 
Davidson (1998) who proposed various degrees of participation, Rowe and Frewer (2005) propose 
a categorisation scheme for defining various levels of engagement. In their study of public 
engagement mechanisms, they identify three key concepts: public communication; public 
consultation; and public participation. In the context of participation practices, the authors 
distinguish them by ³WKHQDWXUHDQGIORZRILQIRUPDWLRQEHWZHHQH[HUFLVHVSRQVRUVDQGSDUWLFLSDQWV´ 
(p. 251): 
 
Communication - one-way information flow, from sponsor to the public, and no feedback is sought.  
Consultation - one-way information flow, from the public to the sponsor (e.g. answering questions 
from sponsor), but with no dialogue.  
Participation - two-way exchange of information, between sponsor and public, where there is the 
potential for opinion transformation in either party. 
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According to this perspective, they explain how the effectiveness of such engagement can be 
measured: 
³«DQH[HUFLVH
VHIIHFWLYHQHVVPD\ be ascertained by the efficiency with which full, relevant 
information is elicited from all appropriate sources, transferred to (and processed by) all 
appropriate recipients, and combined (when required) to give an  
aggregate/consensual UHVSRQVH´ (p. 251). 
 
µ(QJDJHPHQW¶LQWKHILUVWLQVWDQFHLVXVHGWRUHIHUWRWKHIRUPDOSURFHVVHVXVHGWRLQFOXGHPHmbers 
of the public in decision-making processes, and to facilitate the collection or integration of their 
views, to a greater or lesser extent (Cass 2006). The reasons for engagement are important to 
explore. EQJDJHPHQWLVLPSRUWDQWEXWPHDQLQJIXOHQJDJHPHQWFRQGXFWHGµIRUWKHULJKWUHDVRQV¶
is critical. Within a philosophical context, Fiorino (1990) provided three arguments for public 
engagement and involvement: the substantive argument, the normative argument, and the 
instrumental DUJXPHQW7KHVHDUJXHDQGSURPRWHWKHYDOXHRIOD\SHRSOH¶VMXGJHPHQWVRQULVNWKH
promotion of public participation based on the notion of democracy, and the mitigation of conflict 
and promotion of trust, acceptability and decision legitimacy, respectively. Similar arguments for 
public participation have been discussed by Beierle and Cayford (2002). The importance of public 
and stakeholder engagement has been acknowledged among varied disciplines, as demonstrated 
by Mathur, Price and Austin (2008) in their paper on the sustainability of construction projects. They 
concur with authors such as Fiorino albeit expressing the concept differently, whilst adding to these 
existing reasons to engage by suggesting a fourth, in that it can build social capital. They also 
propose that stakeholder engagement represents a process of social learning among stakeholders: 
³«DVRFLDOSURFHVVZKHUHGLYHUVHVWDNHKROGHUVVKDUHDFRPPRQIRUXPOHDUQDERXWHDFKRWKHU¶V
YDOXHVUHIOHFWXSRQWKHLURZQYDOXHVDQGFUHDWHDVKDUHGYLVLRQDQGVKDUHGREMHFWLYHV´S 
 
More recently, Wright (2012) has stated that not only is participation able to remove opposition to, 
or influence, a decision or proposal, but it is indeed a democratic right for local communities, 
echoing the normative argument of Fiorino (1990).  
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Degrees of engagement can influence levels of public and stakeholder support for large-scale 
developments, such as nationally significant energy infrastructure. For example, and particularly in 
UHJDUGVWRHQJDJHPHQWZLWKµWKHSXEOLF¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIPDUJLQDOLVDWLRQDQGEHLQJH[FOXGHGIURP
decision-making processes can have significant impacts on public support. Barnett et al. (2012) 
note that when members of the public feel marginalised or perceive their concerns and priorities to 
be ignored, negative emotions can result, which can contribute to negative assessments of 
projects, which in turn can lead to their active opposition. Concurrently, the authors detail the 
findings of scholars who have found that positive public perceptions are associated with the active 
involvement of local citizens (Devine-Wright 2005, Loring 2007), whilst Wolsink (2007) asserts that 
local support may turn to opposition if the concerns of local stakeholders are not considered and 
incorporated into decision-making process.  
,WLVLPSRUWDQWDWWKLVVWDJHWRDFNQROZHGJHWKHQRWLRQRIµSXEOLFV¶DQGWKHFRPSOH[LW\VXUURXQGLQJ
these societal actors. Of particular interest to this work is how people in socieW\RU µSXEOLFV¶DUH
imagined by organisations and bodies such as governments and industries to use two examples, 
DQGKRZWKLVLQIOXHQFHVDSSURDFKHVWRHQJDJHPHQW µ,PDJLQHGSXEOLFV¶ LVDWHUPGLVFXVVHGLQD
range of contexts in the literature, particularly in the context of expert-lay people relatonships and 
interactions (see Maranta, Guggenheim et al. 2003), and of relevance to this project is the context 
of energy technologies and developments (see Walker, Cass et al. 2010, Barnett, Burningham et 
al. 2012, Cotton and Devine-Wright 2012). Such studies argue that effective engagement cannot 
RFFXUZLWKRXWILUVWFRQVLGHULQJRUµLPDJLQLQJ¶ZKRLVWREHHQJDJHGZLWK. For example, Cotton and 
Devine-Wright (2012) identify the conceptualisation of public actors, by UK electricity transmission 
network-UHODWHG DFWRUV DV µFXVWRPHUV¶ by distribution and transmission network operators and 
µFRQVXPHUV¶E\WKHUHJXODWRUDQGWKDWQHWZRUNRSHUDWRUVDUHHIIHFWLYHO\µKLGGHQ¶IURPWKHSXEOLFE\
³HPEHGGHGQHWZRUNVDQGUHJXODWRU\VWUXFWXUHV´ S,QUHJDUGVWRWKHLQIOXHQFHRIµWKHSXEOLF¶
on sociotechnical change, Walker et al. (2010) state that µWKHSXEOLF¶DUHSROLWLFDODFWRUVZKRDUH
potentially implicated in such processes, arguing that the influence ³Rf public subjectivities on 
VRFLRWHFKQLFDOFKDQJH´ applies not only to activities such as participation and protest but also by 
the way they are ³LPDJLQHGJLYHQDJHQF\DQGLQYRNHGIRUYDULRXVSXUSRVHVE\DFWRUVLQWHFKQLFDO-
LQGXVWULDODQGSROLF\QHWZRUNV´ (p. 931). We introduce the concept of imagined publics here, and 
will explore it in greater detail in future work. We will seek to progress the concept beyond merely 
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KRZµSXEOLFV¶DUHLPDJLQHGE\H[WHUQDODFWRUV, largely absent of input from these public actors on 
their identification and conceptualisation, and how engagement is often then directed and based 
upon these external DVVXPSWLRQVDQGµLPDJLQLQJV¶. 
The quality of participation outputs, there-in-part reflecting the quality of engagement, has long 
been difficult to determine due to insufficient empirical evidence from studies of the quality of 
engagement methods, leading to a dearth of ³DSSURSULDWHEHQFKPDUNVIRUHYDOXDWLRQ´ (Rowe and 
Frewer 2000: 3). This report, whilst not intending to explicitly identify evaluator benchmarks, intends 
to identify important characteristics of engagement deemed by different stakeholders to be positive, 
of high quality, and effective; similar criteria-based studies have been conducted by authors such 
as Rowe and Frewer (2000). Effective engagement requires dialogue at its centre, whereby an 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRISHRSOH¶VFLUFXPVWDQFHVQHHGVDQGSULRULWLHVDVZHOOas their applicable experience 
and assets, is attained (Whitton, Parry et al. 2016). As Noland and Phillips (2010) state in regards 
to studies of this nature, and reflecting the foundation of our document, ³DWLVVXH«LVZKDWSURSHU
HQJDJHPHQWUHTXLUHVDQGHQWDLOV´(p. 40).  
Stakeholder engagement is associated with notions such as equity, fairness and justice that are 
considered important components of engagement which is ethically legitimate and effective.  For 
example, Rowe and Frewer (2000) identify nine criteria for effective engagement, several of which 
UHODWHWRWKHFRQFHSWRIµIDLUQHVV¶,QWHUHVtingly, Rowe and Frewer (2000) assert that there are few 
benchmarks for the assessment of engagement, whilst Rowe et al. (2008) identify that engagement 
processes are not commonly evaluated. Often, the concept of fairness is elaborated using 
H[SUHVVLRQVVXFKDVµHTXLW\¶RIFRVWVDQGEHQHILWV DQGµGLVWULEXWLRQDOMXVWLFH¶VRFLHWDOGLVWULEXWLRQ
RIFRVWVDQGEHQHILWVRUµSURFHGXUDOMXVWLFH¶IDLUDQGMXVWSURFHGXUHVJenkins et al. (2016) note 
that procedural justice is closely associated with stakeholder engagement, in that pursuits of 
procedural justice inspire research which seeks to ³H[SORUH WKHZD\V LQZKLFKGHFLVLRQ-makers 
KDYHVRXJKWWRHQJDJHZLWKFRPPXQLWLHV´ (p. 175). The concept of procedural justice relates to the 
perceived fairness of an engagement or decision-making process (Sovacool, Sidorstov et al. 2014, 
Simcock 2016). These concepts inform our work of identifying necessary criteria for effective 
engagement, but they do not direct it. Rather, we primarily explore historical accounts and seek the 
views of stakeholders in order to identify such criteria, which we aim to do through this project.  
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The report now explores how engagement is discussed in the literature in the context of industry 
and business, with a focus on the nuclear industry. 
 
2.1. Stakeholder Engagement and Industry 
The importance of identifying and communicating with public stakeholders for businesses is based 
upon the multifarious impacts that they have on different societies. As has been shown by events 
such as Chernobyl in the Ukraine in 1986 and Fukushima in Japan in 2011, these impacts have 
been shown to be potentially significant and enduring in the context of nuclear power. Bowen, 
Newenham-Kahindi and Herremans (2010) QRWHWKDWZKHQSULYDWHILUPVHQJDJHRUµLQWHUIDFH¶ZLWK
communities, a well-designed engagement strategy can result in firms gaining legitimacy, 
managing social risks and co-developing ³LQQRYDWLYHVROXWLRQVWRVRFLDOSUREOHPVZLWKFRPPXQLW\
PHPEHUV´ (p. 297) (also see Lowndes, Pratchett et al. 2001, Carey, Beilin et al. 2007). Conversely, 
communities can benefit through access to firm-associated finances, training opportunities, 
influencing and, as previously mentioned, substantive improvements to social problems (Bowen, 
Newenham-Kahindi and Herremans, 2010). 
Several academics support the notion that greater public engagement and participation serves to 
significantly reduce conflict and leads to more robust, sustainable decisions, including those for 
large energy infrastructure developments, such as nuclear power (O'Connor and van den Hove 
2001, Sohn, Yang et al. 2001, Dawson and Darst 2006, Krütli, Flüeler et al. 2010). Devine-Wright, 
Devine-Wright and Sherry-Brennan (2010) have suggested that less opportunity for public 
participation increases the likelihood of public opposition and delays to developments more 
generally, and that these can be varying. Such developments include nuclear waste repository 
siting (Krütli et al., 2010), electricity transmission and infrastructure planning (Cotton and Devine-
Wright 2012), wind energy developments (Cowell, Bristow et al. 2011); tidal energy developments 
(Devine-Wright 2011); and rural renewable energy implementation (Shamsuzzoha, Grant et al. 
2012). However, in cases of airport infrastructure developments, delays can result from extensive 
and very costly engagement processes, such as the public inquiry into plans to construct an 
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additional terminal at Heathrow Airport in the U.K. (Upham, Thomas et al. 2003). To avoid such 
process-related delays, Soneryd (2004) suggests that planners engage with different stakeholders 
at an early stage to understand their different viewpoints and concerns: 
³3URFHVVREMHFWLYHVIRUSODQQHUVFDQEHWRUHGXFHFRVWVDQGGHFLVLRQGHOD\VE\HQVXULQJWKDW
concerns, accurate information, local knowledge and alternatives are considered early on in the 
process; encouraging different stakeholders to express their views and making decision makers 
DQGSURSRQHQWVDFFRXQWDEOH´>S@ 
 
In regards to nuclear power, it has been suggested by Richardson, Rickwood and Rickwood (2013) 
that engagement may demonstrate notable benefits, such as confidence building, increased safety 
and improved stakeholder relations:  
³More engagement with the public in a formal process that accepts and respects the validity of 
scrutiny from civil society represents an immediate step the nuclear industry can take that 
provides additional oversight, builds confidence and can contribute to increased VDIHW\´ [p. 267] 
³$QRSHQSURFHVVRILQWHJUDWLQJSXEOLFLQYROYHPHQWLQWRRSHUDWLRQVFDQWULJJHUDSRVLWLYHIHHGEDFN
cycle creating mutual trust between the operator and the stakeholder com- munities, and also 
UHLQIRUFHDQGHQKDQFHWKHVDIHW\FXOWXUH´>p. 271] 
 
The authors examine five cases (Three Mile Island, U.S.; Pickering, Canada; Sellafield, U.K.; 
Gorleben, Germany; östhammar, Sweden) showing different relationships between the general 
public and the nuclear industry, with four of these providing evidence for the positive influence of 
public involvement on improving safety. In the UK, research has been conducted into the nature of 
stakeholder engagement within different areas of the nuclear industry. Whitton (2009) highlights 
that the nature of the dialogue during the stakeholder engagement process for the Legacy Ponds 
and Legacy Silos (LP&LS) facility at Sellafield, Cumbria in 2005, which was intended to inform 
decision-making, was unclear. The study was conducted to categorise the engagement against 
GHILQLWLRQVRIWKHWHUPµGHOLEHUDWLRQ¶:KLWWRQREVHUYHVWKDWWKHIRUPRIHQJDJHPHQWDQGGHJUHHRI
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deliberation with stakeholders varied at different levels of the engagement process, with the role of 
deliberation decreasing throughout the various stages of the process, and the influence of technical 
decision-making increasing. Consultation, not deliberation, was observed to be the dominant form 
of engagement. Whitton (2011) also highlights the confusion of stakeholders regarding the nature 
of the dialogue carried out during Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) stakeholder 
engagement regarding plans for nuclear site decommissioning activities, and how the process 
would influence the decision-making process. The author suggests that such findings represent a 
lack of institutionalized engagement by the NDA. Such studies assist in highlighting the complexity, 
and non-uniform merits, of engagement. 
Undertaking engagement for illegitimate or for overly-strategic reasons is ill advised. Rowe & 
Frewer (2004) warn that public engagement by policy makers for the sole purpose of increasing 
perceived legitimacy could potentially lead to the rejection of decisions, should the views of the 
public not be recognised and the information gathered not be utilised. A more focussed observation 
is made by Verbruggen et al. , who propose that in political terms, nuclear power decision-making 
is generally characterized by ³SULYDWH DQGRU JRYHUQPHQWDO WHFKQRFUDF\ LQ ZKLFK GHPRFUDWLF
steering and control take up a subordinate position (2014)´ (p. 26). The grey literature has 
previously acknowledged the need for stakeholder engagement; for example, in the field of 
radiation protection it has been proposed for some time that a solely scientific or technocratic 
approach to assessments may be inappropriate (Dunster and Mclean 1970). In response to this 
perceived technocratic quandary, Verbruggen et al. (2014) suggest the need for an independent 
agency of global scale to undertake a review of nuclear power in the context of ³VRFLHW\¶VEHVW
LQWHUHVWV´ (p. 26), which can serve to combat the manipulation of deliberative forums and public 
engagement, which they observe as resulting from the technocratic nature of decision-making, and 
the endorsement of incumbent policy as opposed to policy concerned with sustainable 
development. 
In recent years, particularly in the UK with its renewed focus on energy generation capacity 
replacement and expansion, the nuclear industry appears to be recognising the importance and 
strategic value of engagement, especially that which is more greatly based upon dialogue (see NIC 
2014, NIC 2015). This is not the first time that the nuclear industry in the UK has voiced its support 
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of public engagement and its necessary place in nuclear operations, and public consultations form 
DQLPSRUWDQWSDUWRIWKH8.LQGXVWU\¶VFXUUHQWDQGLQGHHGKLVWRULcal approach to industry practice. 
Importantly for this report, these recent industry-based documents focus quite clearly on moving to 
establish principles for stakeholder engagement. In a report published by the Nuclear Industry 
Council (NIC, 2014), titleG µ,Q WKH 3XEOLF (\H¶ WKH KLJK OHYHO VWUDWHJ\ IRU &HQWUDO DQG :HOVK
Government for communication and engagement is presented. A review of the grey literature is 
provided in the report, where it is stated that the sector must be clear in its communications with 
the public, and that particular parts of society should be engaged by utilising a range of approaches 
which are ³DSSURSULDWHO\WDUJHWHG´ (p. 5). This report follows the 2013 Nuclear Industrial Strategy 
(BIS 2013), in which public engagement with local stakeholders is acknowledged as important for 
several reasons, including improving understanding of the nuclear industry and addressing barriers 
to local employment. The NIC (2014) report also states that mutual respect must be built by the 
sector in order for public trust in communications to be developed and realised; this requires the 
use of individuals who are trusted by society for public engagement purposes, including individuals 
VXFK DV WKH QXFOHDU ZRUNIRUFH ZKR DUH HQJDJHG LQ WKH µIURQW OLQH LQ WKH VHFWRU¶ LQGHSHQGHQW
academic experts, and scientists working at academic and government laboratories. Whilst 
remaining at the level of engagement (i.e. consultation) as has been undertaken by the industry for 
many years, it reprioritises public dialogue which is open, transparent, and understandable to public 
stakeholders, acknowledged as reflecting a great diversity of individuals at the local level with 
different needs and preferences, both towards engagement methods and also more generally (NIC, 
2014). As a result of the NIC report (NIC, 2014), the µNIC Concordat for Public Engagement¶ was 
developed (NIC, 2015), detailing the intentions of the nuclear industry for engaging with society on 
nuclear energy matters and the main principles which organisations should utilise within their 
communication strategies. Within this document, the themes highlighted in the 2014 report ± clarity, 
trust, dialogue and consultation ± characterise the nuclear LQGXVWU\¶V DSSURDFK WR SXEOLF
engagement. It is stated that two-way communication is valued and that the public are listened to, 
that public trust be developed through demonstration of respect and being open and transparent in 
regards to challenges faced and actions taken, that engagement utilises clear, consistent and 
concise information, and that local communities be listened to and actively engaged.  
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In addition to opposition that a technology such as nuclear power may face in broad terms (i.e. 
whether nuclear power should be developed and utilised at all), the controversial nature of 
technological infrastructure siting is known to commonly generate opposition and struggle to gain 
widespread support. As Cotton and Devine-Wright (2012) suggest, development success is in part 
dependent on the acquisition of support from various aspects of society, such as local communities 
and stakeholder groups. In order to achieve this and to mitigate opposition, stakeholder 
engagement and participation in decision-making processes is cited as a common solution: 
³:KHUHVXFKRSSRVLWLRQRFFXUVRQHRIW-cited solution is to improve the level of direct community 
and stakeholder involvement in the processes and outcomes of decision-PDNLQJ´LELG 
 
Such notions are echoed by Young (2004), who asserts that societal acceptance of modern 
technologies which are associated with risk and generate concern requires dialogue which is both 
open and utilised throughout the development process. Not only this, but Young also suggests that 
technological and science-based opportunities are more likely to be realised if the appropriate 
individuals are engaged early and throughout this process, and in an appropriate manner: 
³,QIRUPDWLRQPXVWEHPDGHDYDLODEOHLQDIRUPDWWKDWFDQEHXQGHUVWRRGHDVLO\$OOVLGHVLQWKH
debate have responsibilities: scientists must be willing to answer questions openly and honestly, 
industry must engage early and widely, and pressure groups and the media must be responsible 
LQWKHLUXVHRIVFLHQFH´S 
 
Authors such as Hagendijk and Irwin (2006) have noted that efforts by organisations and 
companies in European countries to include and involve public and stakeholder groups are borne 
out of a desire to mitigate scepticism and mistrust which has impacted the realisation of 
technological infrastructure projects. Indeed, in the UK in particular, engagement and a move 
towards greater dialogue with stakeholders has become more common, away from the limited 
SURYLVLRQRIµXSGDWHV¶DQGRQH-way information; the House of Lords Select Committee on Science 
and Technology (2000) describe this move as indicating that dialogue and engagement are integral 
to science-based policy making. In January of this year, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency 
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concluded at an expert-attended workshop in Paris that public engagement was of central 
importance to the industry, and that ³VWDNHKROGHU VXSSRUW DQG LQYROYHPHQW DUH HVVHQWLDO WR
DFKLHYLQJDFFHSWHGDQGVXVWDLQDEOHGHFLVLRQVIRUQHDUO\DOODVSHFWVRIQXFOHDUHQHUJ\´ (OECD-
NEA 2017). This increasing support for engagement has led to changes to the nature of ³SROLWLFDO
decision-making over the governance of technological decision-PDNLQJ´ (Cotton and Devine-
Wright, 2012: 19), whereby engagement at different stages of developing policy has become 
institutionalised practice, and whereby the utilisation of deliberative methods have become 
common practice.  
 
Whilst effective stakeholder engagement has increasingly become a central goal for many involved 
in large-scale technological developments, common flaws and limitations in engagement 
processes have been highlighted. Wilsdon and Wallis (2004) observe that risk-focussing often 
takes precedent in engagement forums, whereby the known risks as presented by experts are 
discussed in detail, whilst unknown and unanticipated consequences, more commonly raised by 
public stakeholders (see Grove-White, Macnaghten et al. 2000), receive little attention. A further 
flaw of engagement processes is the origin and composition of their content, as Wynne (2005) 
notes. He highlights that public engagement is devised by experts with very little or no input from 
WKRVHZKRDUHWREHµHQJDJHG¶7KHUHIRUHPHPEHUVRIWKHSXEOLFPD\SDUWLFLSDWHLQHQJDJHPHQW
but will have no capacity to influence, create or negotiate ³PRUHGLYHUVHSXEOLFPHDQLQJV´ (p. 67). 
Wynne asserts that this presupposes ³D QRUPDWLYH VWDQGDUGL]HG PRGHO RI FLWL]HQV´ (ibid), 
associated with the imposition of ³VWDQGDUGL]HGDQGVXSSRVHGO\REMHFWLYHSXEOLFPHDQLQJV´ (ibid) 
ZKLFKKHWHUPVµULVNLVVXHV¶LVVXHGHILQLWLRQVZKLFKDUHSHUFHLYHGWREHVROHO\WKHGRPDLQRIH[SHUWV
and institutions. Thus, engagement is limited and the outcomes of engagement process are 
tethered and pre-determined. 
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2.2. Engagement and Sustainability 
Decision-making and engagement for new and emergent energy technologies such as new nuclear 
power stations are areas which have been highlighted as critical for their success and sustainability. 
Whereas sustainable development refers to a timeline, whereby various ³SULQFLSOHVDSSURDFKHV
strategies and policies may help us to develop and implement our future vision of a sustainable 
VRFLHW\´ *ODYLþDQG/XNPDQ for current and future generations, sustainability refers to 
the ability to and potential of maintaining progress along this timeline and acheiving this reality. 
Cotton (2014) asserts that support for these technologies, from established elected members and 
shareholders to locally affected communities and public interest groups, is seen as increasingly 
important by governments and technology development organisations in the face of social and 
ethical challenges. The author states that public support is considered necessary both ³DV D
SURFHVVRIMXVWLI\LQJWHFKQRORJLFDOSROLF\RSHQO\LQFLYLOVRFLHW\´and for ³GHIXVLQJWKHW\SHVRISXEOLF
opposition WKDWFDQUHVXOWLQGHYHORSPHQWIDLOXUHDQGZDVWHGSXEOLFVHFWRUDQGLQGXVWU\UHVRXUFHV´ 
(ibid: 1). Cotton also stresses that debates about the impacts of technological development and 
implementation cannot continue to follow the traditional format of expert-led technocracy, or as 
Cotton writes, ³DSXUHO\REMHFWLYHDQG IDFWXDO GLVFXVVLRQ ERXQGHG E\ WKH UDWLRQDOLW\ RI WHFKQR-
VFLHQWLILFDQDO\VLV´ (ibid: 161).  The author explains why this is both insufficient and inappropriate: 
 
³1HLWKHUTXDQWLWDWLYHULVNDVVessments alone, nor finding ways to encourage better public 
understanding of scientific and technical issues will facilitate consensus building or public 
acceptance [of] SECT[s]1 in the public realm, because the nature of risk debates implicitly 
involves complex ethical issues, numerous and conflicting relationships, trust and social 
FDSLWDO´ (p. 161). 
 
In a recent study, Verbruggen et al. (2014) FRQVLGHU WKH µVXVWDLQDEOH¶QDWXUHRIQXFOHDUSRZHU
concerned with assessing the potential role of nuclear power (fission) in sustainable development. 
                                                     
1 SECTs - Socially and Ethically Contentious Technologies (Cotton, 2014) 
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They develop and apply a 19 criterion framework in their study based upon the five dimensions of 
µEnvironment¶, µEconomy¶, µRisk¶, µSociety¶, and µGovernance¶. They question the capacity of nuclear 
power to legitimately contribute towards broad sustainable development, which is further impeded 
by an apparent lack of engagement or dialogue between nuclear proponents and opponents 
specifically as to the potential role of nuclear in a low-carbon energy future. Insufficient or ineffective 
engagement with those impacted directly by developments may mitigate the ability of developers 
WRXQGHUVWDQGKRZWKHVHLPSDFWVDUHH[SHULHQFHGµRQWKHJURXQG¶DQGZKLFKLPSDFWVDUHIHOWPRVW
strongly by affected communities. If the main impacts of developments on communities are not 
economic, then economic solutions are unlikely to adequately address community needs and 
concerns. For example, Kunreuther et al. (1990) has highlighted that compensatory actions can be 
deemed and interpreted by those in receipt of such economic payments as bribes when they are 
XQUHODWHGWRDIDFLOLW\¶VGLUHFWLPSDFWVVXFKDVKHDOWK-related impaFWVZKLFKFDQµEDFNILUH¶XSRQ
the operator.  
 
In a European energy context, public engagement is currently viewed as necessary and 
appropriate. The EC Energy Road Map 2050 asserts that decision-making processes should 
ensure that citizens are informed and engaged, and Dorfman, Prikken and Burall (2012) propose 
that if this is conducted meaningfully whereby public stakeholders are involved in and are able to 
influence the process, the resulting integration of knowledges (public, policy, expert) facilitates 
accountability, transparency and action regarding necessary change.  
 
We have reviewed both a range of literature to provide context on the concept of engagement, 
highlighting what it commonly entails, its recommended form, and how stakeholder engagement 
for the nuclear industry, particularly in the UK, is currently evolving. Informed by our review of both 
the academic, governmental and industrial literature, several principles for effective stakeholder 
engagement have been identified, and are presented in Table 1. 
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Principle Summary of Principle 
Timely engagement 
(QJDJHZLWKVWDNHKROGHUVµXS-VWUHDP¶DQGSULRUWRNH\GHFLVLRQ-making 
periods to legitimise engagement and stakeholder input 
Dialogue-based engagement 
Information provision and expert-to-stakeholder communication alone is 
often inappropriate and insufficient. A dialogue-based approach enables 
both parties to explore issues and decisions, and also understand 
stakeholder values and priorities. This is not to discourage the provision of 
µSURMHFWXSGDWHV¶HQWLUHO\EXWWRXWLOLVHPRUHGLUHFWWKDQLQGLUHFW
communication 
Wide and objective 
engagement 
Engage with a range of stakeholders and understand the positions and 
needs of various stakeholders, absent of bias or subjectivity. This is 
important for reasons of democracy, equity and procedural justice. 
Open and transparent 
procedures 
If processes of engagement are limited, if dialogue is restricted, or if those 
involved are unwilling to discuss important issues, constructive outcomes 
and shared learning are less likely to occur 
Context Dependency 
Engagement structure and content should be in-part determined by 
stakeholders, so as to validate topics under discussion and to address 
issues of greatest concern for all parties. Understanding the specific 
context of each community or group facilitates more effective engagement 
and decision-making. 
Extra-political engagement 
The impacts of infrastructure decisions often exceed political timescales 
and terms of office, and affect local stakeholders to a greater degree than 
those in decision-making positions. It is recommended that stakeholder 
engagement is not excessively influenced by political timescales and the 
intentions of changing political parties. 
Procedural justice 
Fair, inclusive, accessible and well-conducted procedures can be as 
important as decision outcomes themselves. If procedures are seen to be 
conducted fairly, then resulting decisions, whilst not being explicitly 
supported, may be accepted by stakeholders 
 
Table 1. Public Stakeholder Engagement Principles 
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We now explore several country-specific reports produced as part of the HoNESt project in regards 
to evidence of historical engagement. We examine seven country-specific cases to identify 
examples of engagement, what these process of engagement entailed and did not entail, and what 
these processes highlight in regards to important aspects or components of µeffective¶ or 
µsuccessful¶ engagement. 
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3. Country-specific Reports: Examples of engagement 
The report now briefly discusses each of the seven countries under consideration, which were 
selected according the criteria of geography (location), political system, social movements of 
opposition, and culture and democracy: 
x United Kingdom (Butler and Bud, 2016)  
x Ukraine (Kasperski, 2016) 
x Germany (Kirchhof and Trischler, 2016)  
x Bulgaria (Hristov and Tchalakov, 2016) 
x Sweden (Kaijser, 2016)  
x Finland (Michelson, Bergman and Harjula, 2016) 
x Spain (Rubio-Varas, De la Torre, Espluga and Presas, 2016)  
 
Each sub-section is directly informed by the historical short country reports produced by leading 
historians in their respective countries, and highlights aspects of the social history of each case 
which involve instances of engagement, or lack of engagement. 
  
3.1. United Kingdom 
In the UK, stakeholder engagement has enabled SXEOLF RU µOD\¶ contributions to be made into 
traditionally expert-limited processes. Examples of stakeholder engagement include the planning 
inquiry held from 1977 - 78 for the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) that involved 
environmental NGOs, and the Sizewell B planning inquiry held from 1982 - 85 for the first 
Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) in the UK, which took place over 340 days and took reference 
from 16 million words of evidence, including from non-nuclear industry bodies and stakeholder 
organisations. At the time of the Sizewell B inquiry, Davies (1984) noted the apparent objectivity of 
the process, whilst questioning the usefulness of the inquiry and its ability to facilitate genuine 
participation: 
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³(YHQWKRXJKWKH,QTXLU\ZLOOQRWEHDEOHWRPDNHHYHU\RQHKDSS\DQGHYHQWKRXJKLWV
cumbersome process will not provide a perfect model for future inquiries, the Sizewell B Inquiry 
does appear so far to have been objective and accurate. But no matter how fair and balanced the 
Inquiry can be, doubt must remain about its ultimate usefulness as a decision-making tool and as 
a vehicle of real participation in the assessment of WKLVWHFKQRORJ\´ (p. 21). 
 
Furthermore, Davies argues that the inquiry was representative of progress in the context of nuclear 
decision-making and public access to information: 
 
³)RUDFRXQWU\PRUHDFFXVWRPHGWRPDNLQJQXFOHDUSRZHUGHFLVLRQVOLWHUDOO\Ln the classified 
environment of the corridors of power, the participatory form of the Sizewell decision-making 
process is a significant advance. For the first time, the whole nuclear safety case is fully available 
for public scrutiny (except for some proprLHWDU\WHFKQLFDOGHWDLOV´ (ibid). 
 
During the mid-1980s, Davies (1984) notes the importance of engagement and procedure in the 
context of decision-making; whilst members of the public may have significant outcome-related 
concerns, the complicated nature of arguments to inform judgements on safety or cost for example, 
mean that procedure-related concerns are also very important. More recently, procedural 
considerations and effective engagement has been discussed in the context of themes such as 
social and energy justice (Whitton, Parry et al. 2015, Whitton, Parry et al. 2016). 
 
,W LV DOVR DSSDUHQW WKDW WKH 8. JRYHUQPHQW FRQVLGHUHG WKH FRQILGHQFH RI WKH %ULWLVK µLPDJLQHG
SXEOLF¶RQZKLFKWKHLUHOHFWHGSRZHULVGHSHQGent, in the national nuclear programme to be of such 
importance that it necessitated the choice of the safest nuclear reactor technology available during 
the mid-1970s. Concerns about the response of such imagined publics are proposed to be a factor 
in major changes made to planned policy or engagement tactics (Walker, Cass et al. 2010, Barnett, 
Burningham et al. 2012, Cotton and Devine-Wright 2012). Such concerns about the sensitivity of 
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imagined publics contributed towards the construction of the more expensive, but technically safer, 
British Steam Generating Heavy Water Reactors in order to replace several Advanced Gas-cooled 
Reactors. 
More recently, following the publication of the 2008 Energy White Paper on Nuclear Power, the UK 
government published details of its extensive consultations on the paper with various groups, 
including the general public.  In a series of discussion sessions, citizen panels and focus groups, 
members of the public were asked their opinions on the safety and reliability of nuclear power 
FRPSDUHGZLWKUHQHZDEOHVRXUFHVDQGRSLQLRQVRQWKHQRWLRQRIH[SDQGLQJWKHFRXQWU\¶VQXFOHDU
capacity. Responses to such questions were mixed, highlighting moral concerns about nuclear 
power, but also indicating a reluctant acceptance that nuclear power was a necessary part of the 
energy mix in a low-carbon economy. These sessions, which were managed by a private 
communications group and assessed by other groups to ensure validity, were opposed by 
environmental groups such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth who argued that they were 
biased towards the pro-nuclear intentions of government and decisions that had already been 
WDNHQ:KLOVWWKHSURFHVVZDVWHUPHGDµSXEOLFFRQVXOWDWLRQ¶WKHSURFHVVLQIRUPed policy decisions 
being made by the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR 2008a, 
BERR 2008b), and had an impact on the 2008 White Paper. Finally, and although not related to 
nuclear energy generation, the site selection process for a geological waste repository conducted 
in Cumbria in 2012 (see WCMRWS 2012) provides an more recent example of a significant period 
of stakeholder engagement, which whilst demonstrating a number of aspects of good practice such 
as early engagement, opportunity to volunteer, and several opportunities for public involvement, 
saw the process and final selection decision ultimately undermined by the realisation of a binding 
threshold after which the decision to host the repository could not be vetoed or retracted by the 
community and its representatives. 
 
 
3.2. Ukraine 
Contrasting with countries such as the United Kingdom, Ukraine provides an example of where 
engagement has historically been avoided. Of particular interest is the absence of public 
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engagement regarding the Chernobyl accident. Ukraine, Belarus and Russia were heavily 
contaminated with radiation following an accident at the Chernobyl NPP in April 1986. However, 
information by the authorities was very slow to be released, the amount of information released 
was limited, and false narratives were released by the state media to play down and misreport the 
consequential risks of the accident. It was not until two days following the accident that evacuations 
from Ukrainian and Belarusian towns and villages local to the Chernobyl facility took place. Very 
little information was provided to these people regarding the accident, despite the knowledge of 
local communities that something significant had taken place at the plant. The lack of information 
provided to workers who were sent to manage the impacts of the accident, and the inadequate 
provision of protective clothing led to the development of serious health problems and fatalities 
among workers.  
Public communication was limited in order to limit knowledge of the event and mitigate a resulting 
societal response to it. Instead of providing appropriate and adequate warnings to affected and 
potentially affected communities in the days and weeks following the accident, infrequent 
messages of optimism, control and appropriate management of the situation were disseminated. 
In addition, some evacuations did not occur until weeks after the event, risking the health and well-
being of local residents.  
This was perpetuated, and the reality of the situation falsified, by the persistent narrative provided 
by officials of the successful management of the consequences from the accident for a number of 
years after in the state controlled media. This asserted a reality of life returning to normal with no 
grounds for public concern, instead focussing on stories of the heroism of emergency workers 
against a depicted radioactive monster. The State ensured that the message put to Ukrainian 
society through the media was one of the Soviet people fighting together against the disaster, with 
the use of military rhetoric and images pervasive in the Soviet media. The accident appeared in 
public discourse from regulators as a crime of communist authorities against the Ukrainian nation 
and society, and whereby national independence was perceived to be the solution for saving people 
from the events of Chernobyl and instigating a national renaissance, viewing Chernobyl as a 
symbol of colonial power. This resulted in anti-nuclear protests between 1989 and 1991. 
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Historical research conducted as part of this project has shown that many local inhabitants were 
aware that the Chernobyl accident was far more serious and dangerous that officials were stating. 
As a result of this and the behaviour of officials, public trust was severely damaged by the event 
and the associated secrecy surrounding its consequences and management, which played a key 
role in the resistance of Ukraine against Soviet rule. Many experts in the country proposed 
informational and educational work with the public as a method to address this mistrust, reflecting 
D SRVLWLRQ RI µH[SHUWV NQRZ EHVW¶ DQG the knowledge deficit model approach (Wynne 1982) of 
gaining support through the provision of scientific facts whereby a better informed public is created, 
and therefore allowing societal concerns WREHRYHUFRPHE\DQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIµVFLHQWLILFIDFWV¶. 
However, the Ukrainian case study highlights the importance of trust in communications and 
engagement between governmental, industrial and public stakeholders. The dearth of any genuine 
and inclusive engagement with members of the public, in particular so as to inform and warn people 
of the impending dangers following a significant nuclear accident, arguably lead to a growth of 
mistrust towards both the government officials and the government-supported nuclear industry, 
which could not then be remedied by providing scientific information. The lack of public trust in 
those in strong support of such scientific endeavours led to future difficulties for many in Ukrainian 
society placing trust in scientific communications from such sources. The Ukrainian case is also 
insightful in the context of energy governance, in that it demonstrates an example of technological 
growth in a country as a result of political influence and external powers of governance. This was 
acutely apparent following the Chernobyl accident when technological protection and political 
security was prioritised over societal safety and human health.   
 
 
3.3. Germany 
,QWKHLQLWLDOSHULRGRI*HUPDQ\¶VQXFOHDUKLVWRU\SXEOLFHQJDJHPHQWZDVOLPited. Between 1952 
and 1957, opportunities for public or civilian involvement in the German Atomic Program were 
scarce, and despite the attempts of the scientific community to establish and maintain nuclear 
science as a civilian endeavour, military interests and rationales remained central to the nuclear 
programme. Throughout the 1970s and 80s, public interaction and engagement with nuclear power 
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most commonly took the form of resistance. Protests and direct action against nuclear facilities 
proposed by the government became common, fuelled by limited opportunities for social groups to 
participate in the planning of such infrastructure. The organised movements against nuclear power 
in Germany have included the involvement of environmental organisations such as Greenpeace, 
and have on many occasions demonstrated both planning and coordination. Continual protests and 
activist-based action represents the primary mode of interaction between society and nuclear 
power developments in Germany. Bearing in mind the decisions taken by the µRed-Green¶ coalition 
(the Social Democratic Party of  *HUPDQ\DQG$OOLDQFHµ7KH*UHHQV-2005) and the serving 
coalition government (the Christian Democratic Union of Germany, the Christian Social Union, and 
the Social Democratic Party of Germany, 2013-present) following the events at Fukushima in 2011 
to move away from nuclear power, the resistance demonstrated by groups within the German 
populace against nuclear power appears to have had a desired impact on national energy policy. 
It is due to this that many in German society and politics interpret this resistance against nuclear 
power and the eventual phase-out as a deeply democratic success story. 
 
7KUHHQRWDEOHHYHQWVLQ*HUPDQ\¶VKLVWRU\LQWKHFRQWH[WRISXEOLFHQJDJHPHQWexperiences include 
the Gorleben, Wackersdorf and Whyl examples. All three represent examples of protest by local 
inhabitants who gained support from other members of wider society, with the proposed repository 
site near the village of Gorleben generating the largest public protests and direct action of all three 
cases. The three examples reflect the regularity of protest against nuclear infrastructure proposals 
WKURXJKRXWWKHFRXQWU\¶VKLVWRU\DWWKHSUHVHQWWLPHQXFOHDUSRZHULVSODQQLQJWREHSKDVHGRXt 
by 2022. What they also seem to demonstrate is the consistent utilisation of a decide-announce-
defend strategy by the nuclear industry and German government, whereby engagement has been 
insufficiently inclusive or upstream and has resulted in protest and resistance to proposed 
developments. As Devine-Wright (2009) observes, a person may feel their attachment to a specific 
place may be negatively impacted by the development leading to contemplations of moving away, 
which can then be combated by opposition groups that form to protest the development and 
mitigate such social dispersions from taking place. Calvano (2007) argues that conflicts between 
multinational corporations and local communities arise due to the confluence of stakeholder power 
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inequality, cultural context and stakeholder perception gaps, of which the German case shows 
evidence in the context of nuclear power. The German case also appears to reflect a common 
societal response of communities responding to large-scale developments as discussed by Cotton 
(2013) in asking a multitude of questions on a broad range of issues such as energy strategy and 
community-level fairness (also see Cotton and Devine-Wright 2013), although insufficient 
engagement on and responses to such societal questioning has led to the adoption of more direct 
and violent approaches to make oppositional positions clear. While many in German society and 
politics interpret the controversy over nuclear energy including the phase out as success story and 
regard the process as deeply democratic, many other countries in Europe are critical of the violence 
of the debates and protests, and consider the phase-out decision as a misguided interpretation of 
the precautionary principle (Moore 2012). However, it is arguable whether the views and arguments 
of those vocal actors involved in the anti-nuclear protest movements were representative of the 
wider German public, and therefore whether a process so clearly influenced by these actions can 
be classified as truly democratic. 
 
3.4. Bulgaria 
Public engagement in Bulgaria in regards to nuclear power developments has, as in other Eastern 
European countries, been limited. The response of Bulgarian society to the significant nuclear 
accident in Chernobyl in Ukraine in 1986 is also of particular interest from a social science and 
interactional perspective, in that it represents a rare response of resistance and questioning from 
the Bulgarian population against the nuclear power programme. The Chernobyl accident also 
represents a key political moment in that it characterizes the end of the Bulgarian Soviet alliance. 
When the accident occurred, the Bulgarian communist government did not inform their population 
about the real scale and consequences of the accident. The lack of official announcements or 
information about the accident, explanations about the necessary radiation-prevention measures, 
eventually led to growing uncertainty, feelings of insecurity and helplessness among the Bulgarian 
people. The state-owned national media reports were minimal, suggesting that there was no 
serious danger to the population, echoing the messages of the Soviet government, thereby 
misinforming people of the potential risks they faced. Activists in Ecoglasnost demanded 
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information about the environmental pollution caused by large-scale technological projects and by 
the Chernobyl accident. These inquiries were assisted by the national television release of a short 
documentary/ environmental movie by the journalist Jurii Zhirov in 1987, on gas and sulphur 
pollution emanating from a Romanian factory across the Danube River, which was found to be 
highly informative for and well received by the Bulgarian public. 
 
Despite the accident, the nuclear programme in Bulgaria was not negatively impacted by the 
Chernobyl accident, and the government continued planning for a second nuclear plant near the 
town of Belene. In the years following the Chernobyl accident, social and environmental 
movements began to develop in Bulgaria. In March 1988, a civil society committee for 
environmental protection of the city of Rousse was founded, and from this point, environmental 
problems became matters of public discussions in an otherwise closed totalitarian society. It was 
not until the Communist regime collapsed in 1989 that there was an asserted response to the 
accident from Bulgarian people and groups. The Green organization Ecoglasnost, founded by 
Sofian intellectuals and activists, were key actors in bringing about political and social changes in 
Bulgaria.  
 
The 1989 movements began as a response to environmental problems, and following more 
information about the Chernobyl accident coming to light and the risks becoming better understood, 
it developed in-part into protesting by Bulgarian green activists against the inadequate measures 
of the Communist Party in the days following the Chernobyl accident and the lack of any information 
provided to the public, leading to wider protests against nuclear facilities. In October 1989, details 
of the Chernobyl accident and its consequences were presented and discussed, with a report about 
the criminal behaviour of the communist ruling elite providing important information to members of 
society, and further discussions being held about the condition of nuclear power facilities in the 
country and the future of nuclear power in Bulgaria. 
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The Bulgarian nuclear power sector has historically been strongly influenced by the political 
environment of the time. During the first thirty years of its development the nuclear industry was 
directed by the ruling Communist Party. Following political change in 1990-1991, public opinion on 
nuclear power became more vocalised, primarily facilitated by the independent Green movement 
µEcoglasnost¶, which in 1992 evolved into a political party. Similar to the Ukrainian example, the 
Bulgarian case provides an interesting example of energy governance, whereby political security 
and technological prosperity was for a significant time deemed more important than the well-being 
and safety of the Bulgarian populace by a communist government, as demonstrated by the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VSRVW-Chernobyl response. This then contributed to political fracture and the growth 
of both public questioning of and uncertainty towards nuclear technologies. Thus, it is observed 
that a dearth of social justice prior to the end of the Bulgarian-Soviet alliance facilitated societal 
movements which increasingly posed questions of governments and industry and sought answers 
in the pursuit of social justice.  
 
3.5. Sweden 
Since its initial stages of development and establishment in Sweden, support for nuclear technology 
has not been ubiquitous or uniform, particularly among political groups. The discussions held within 
the Social Democratic Party on the justification for and future of nuclear weapons development in 
Sweden during the 1950s, despite involving both opponents and proponents of the nuclear 
weapons issue, did not provide an opportunity for wider Swedish society to partake or contribute to 
discussions or influence the decision. This reflects in-part a general lack of opportunity for public 
involvement in technological decision-making in Sweden, as is common with many European 
countries, particularly historically. Therefore, public engagement and participation has been viewed 
as being able to offer limited input into discussions of a technical nature, reflecting the technocratic 
culture which commonly existed in the mid to late-twentieth century throughout Europe. However, 
as we see with companies such as SKB (see Bergmans, Elam et al. 2008, Holmes, Scott et al. 
2016) and radioactive waste management in particular, stakeholder and public engagement has 
come to be recognised as an important component of the decision-making process in Sweden. 
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An important actor in the Swedish case was a scientist named Hannes Alfvén, who was responsible 
for the growth of nuclear critique in Sweden and was highly influential in the perceptual shift against 
nuclear energy. He was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1970 and was highly respected. 
Alfvén became increasingly critical of nuclear power, writing articles in newspapers and contacting 
politicians, and he soon became influential because of his knowledge and the difficulty in being 
able to question his insight and experience. Of particular influence were parliamentarians who 
began to question nuclear power, some of which were part of the Centre Party, the second largest 
party after the Social Democrats, and some of which were part of the Communist Party. They were 
successful in achieving parliamentary approval in early 1973 for a proposal to investigate the risks 
of nuclear power, and for this to be done before any decisions about new nuclear power plants 
were made. The Centre Party had traditionally been the political representative of Swedish farmers, 
but as rural populations rapidly decreased, the party attempted to attract urban voters with a 
"Green" policy of environmentalism and decentralism. In 1978, a national advisory referendum 
concerning the future for nuclear power in Sweden was demanded by an umbrella organization of 
environmental and political groups called Folkkampanjen mot Atomkraft (the People´s Campaign 
against Atomic Power); this referendum represents the most well-known event in the history of 
nuclear power in Sweden. Whilst intensive preparations were made for campaigning in 1979, the 
Three Mile Island accident occurred in the United States. Swedish mass media reported extensively 
about it, with nuclear activists claiming that the accident proved that nuclear power plants were 
vulnerable and dangerous. From this point forward it became much easier for them to collect 
signatures in support of the referendum and gain public support. The referendum campaign dominated 
political life and the mass media for several months prior to its occurrence. It served to bring about the 
coalescence of grassroots movements and activists across Sweden, and the membership of the 
leading organization behind it grew significantly. A week before the referendum, huge demonstrations 
were organized all around Sweden, with at least 25 000 people gathering in Stockholm in support of 
the movement against nuclear power expansion. However, the referendum was lost and the campaign 
for continuation and expansion of nuclear power in Sweden was successful in winning the vote. In the 
context of energy governance, this reflects positive elements such as procedural justice; an open, 
national procedure which enabled members of the public to have their say on and influence a matter 
of national energy-related significance. The Swedish case demonstrates instances of social justice, 
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through the utilization of democratic and inclusive procedures for example, that are largely absent from 
other European cases such as Ukraine, Bulgaria and Spain. 
Over a decade later in 1990, a former trade union leader was newly appointed as Minister of 
Energy, and a tripartite agreement was reached between the Social Democrat Party, the Centre 
Party, and the Liberal Party in 1991 which postponed the start of the nuclear decommissioning 
programme; however, this did not alter the agreed 2010 end date. This demonstrates the different 
influences of government actors on the fortunes of the nuclear programme. Finally, environmental 
activists found that similar groups in the United States were increasingly questioning nuclear power 
during the 1970s, which encouraged them to learn more about the growing critique against the 
proposed large-scale programme of nuclear power and began disseminating it to wider society.  
The Swedish case reveals a transformation of sorts in the context of engagement, from limited 
public stakeholder involvement and the dominance of political groups surrounding nuclear 
discourse during the early phases of nuclear development in Sweden, to a modern appreciation of 
the consultation and consideration of public stakeholders as demonstrated by a current variety of 
public engagement activities as carried out by organisations such as SKB, particularly surrounding 
nuclear waste disposal projects. This, as can also be seen in Finland, reflects in-part the liberal 
democratic nature of the country. The Swedish case differs from those of cases such as Ukraine, 
Bulgaria and Spain in the context of energy governance in that greater levels of trust of those 
involved or associated with nuclear energy have emerged from decades of public engagement and 
opportunities of choice, such as national referenda. 
 
3.6. Finland 
)LQODQG¶VSROLWLFDOV\VWHPKDVDOORZHGIRUGHPRFUDWLFGHEDWHWKDWKDVHQDEOHGWKHLQYROYHPent of 
both proponents and opponents alike. Policy making in Finland is traditionally a democratic process 
that engages groups from across society. Political parties are also seen to be divided on key issues 
concerning nuclear energy. In general, Social Democrats and Conservatives, and recently the 
Populist Party, have supported nuclear energy, whilst the left wing socialists in the Green party 
have opposed its utilisation, whereas )LQODQG¶V&HQWUDO3arty has seen its views fluctuate over time. 
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'XULQJWKH¶VDQG¶VWKHSDUW\RSSRVHGQHZQXFOHDULQLWLDWLYHVEXWUHFHQWO\WKHSDUW\KDV
been one of the most vocal supporter of new nuclear power stations. At present, the Finnish 
government and parliament have accepted licenses for two new reactors (Olkiluoto 3 and 
Fennovoima 1). This decision has faced opposition in Finland, with people claiming the uncertain 
economic situation in Europe warrants a move towards less costly technologies.  
The Finnish nuclear industry has reduced in size considerably since the 1990s, and those in 
opposition to nuclear energy claim that there is no longer a need for large-scale, centralized 
electricity production, but rather a move towards more decentralised generation of electricity. 
Others believe it to still represent a key source of reliable base-load electricity generation. This also 
comes at a time when Finland has suffered with the decreasing success and profit-making of 
several Finnish technological companies in a fiercely competitive international market, such as 
Nokia. At present, for the first time in their history, there is no political consensus on how the Finnish 
energy policy should be formulated. 
The use of nuclear technology for civil purposes is an influential aspect of nuclear-society 
interaction. The country has not experienced an erosion of trust in the sector and government more 
widely. A techno-centric approach to decision making is still common in Finland, as with other 
European countries. However, unlike other countries, trust in nuclear energy has largely remained 
due to the avoidance of pursuing nuclear military applications. Finnish society does not view the 
decision-making of experts without significant input from wider society as wholly negative, but still, 
there has been opposition against nuclear for many years within government and civil society. 
Public engagement forms a central part of site-related decision making processes, and remains to 
the present day to such an extent that Finland is now in a political deadlock over energy policy; this 
perhaps highlights some of the difficulties in discussing energy governance, such as what it should 
involve versus what shoulGUHVXOWIURPµSRVLWLYH¶HQHUJ\JRYHUQDQFHDQGZKHWKHUSROLWLFDOGHDGORFN
RYHUWKHIXWXUHRIDWHFKQRORJ\LVDµVXFFHVVIXO¶RXWFRPHRIDGHPRFUDWLFDSSURDFKWRJRYHUQDQFH. 
However, the relationships between nuclear energy companies and Finnish society, when 
compared to other countries, can be viewed as more positive with less controversy. 
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3.7. Spain 
The transition in Spain from the authoritarian Franco regime, following his death, to democracy in 
the mid-1970s resulted in significant institutional change, and new opportunities for public 
engagement and intervention. The governmental transition led to an increase in public debate and 
IURPRQZDUGVWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V(QHUJ\3ODQZDVUHYLHZHGGLVFXVVHGDQGDSSURYHGLQD
multi-party parliamentary setting. Opportunities were also presented for Spanish society to be 
heard, especially in regions where nuclear power stations were being constructed. Even prior to 
)UDQFR¶VGHDWKWKHUHZHUHXQVWUXFWXUHGLQIRUPDOVRFLDOJURXSVZKLFKSURSRVHGIRUPDOFRPSODLQWV
by local authorities in most of the locations where nuclear projects were discussed and planned, 
but following his death, civil strategies which were illegal within the dictatorship such as meetings, 
pamphlets, demonstrations, parades, voluntary confinement emerged and were more greatly 
utilised. Increased local media coverage also brought lobbying by stakeholder groups further into 
the public eye.  
 
The moratorium on nuclear development in 1984 due to economic and political factors resulted in 
a cessation of the state nuclear programme. Many private meetings took place between 
government officials, electric utilities and both national and international banks; these discussions 
did not permeate to the public level. Indeed, the government disbanded any communication 
strategy for informing the public about the moratorium, and neither anti-nuclear movements nor 
local citizens were consulted about the moratorium. The moratorium remained in place until 1992, 
during which period communications and engagement activities were few. Communication 
surrounding the operationalisation of nuclear power infrastructure mainly took place in the media. 
 
In regards to public opinion towards nuclear energy in Spain, historical research has shown that 
the evidence available on this subject is rather limited and fragmented. Longitudinal studies are 
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only available from the 1990s, which show that the majority of Spaniards opposed nuclear energy 
and the development of nuclear power stations, and that these levels of opposition and rejection of 
nuclear expansion in Spain are high when compared to other EU countries, such as the U.K., and 
are more comparable to public opinion in Germany. Social movements in the 1970s, 1990s and 
mid 2000s demonstrate this. Following the fall of the Franco Regime, anti-nuclear protests during 
the 1970s were associated with strong regional identities. In the Basque case, this translated into 
violent action, with 13 lives being lost. In 1976 this movement progressed and became increasingly 
organised, with the Committee for the Defence of a No Nuclear Basque Coast (CDCVNN) forming 
through an a amalgamation of anti-nuclear neighbourhood associations, cultural groups and 
professional associations. ,QGXULQJWKH*XOI:DUWKHFDPSDLJQµ/LYLQJZLWKRXWQXFOHDU¶ZDV
launched, which saw approximately half a million signatures collected, requesting a referendum to 
close nuclear power plants in Spain. In 2007, more than 600,000 signatures were collected and 
brought to Brussels demanding the shutdown of plants, uranium mining and research on their 
effects on health.  
  
Whilst it is possible to assume that the dearth of nuclear-related public engagement for many 
decades in Spain has directly contributed to the lack of support for nuclear power (e.g. the OECD 
(2010) suggests that lack of information contributes to concerns towards nuclear power), there is 
little social science research on this subject to provide support for such assumptions. 
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4. Engagement Spectrum 
In order to conceptualise the engagement experiences of the seven countries considered in this 
report, we attempt below to indicate broadly where each country lies on an engagement spectrum, 
depicting engagement activity and a broad representation of the efforts made by governments and 
industry organisations to engage with public stakeholders about nuclear power since the mid-
twentieth century. This is shown in Figure 1. We acknowledge that the degrees of engagement for 
each country have varied over time, but focus in this report on identifying pricniples for engagement; 
this aspect of the historical development of each country will be considered in future work. 
 
 
Figure 1. Spectrum of Stakeholder Engagement Activity for seven European Countries (~ 1950 ± 
Present) 
 
 
Whilst this spectrum reveals the degree to which these countries, in general terms, have engaged 
with their respective general publics and public stakeholders in the context of nuclear power, it does 
QRWUHYHDOLQWXUQWKHµVXFFHVV¶RIWKRVHHQJDJHPHQWDFWLYLWLHV5DWKHUZHREVHUYHWKHDSSDUHQW
implications of these varying approaches to engagement employed by each country in an attempt 
to determine which approaches to engagement have had positive social impacts in their respective 
FRQWH[WV7KHZRUGµFRQWH[W¶LVSDUWLFXODUO\LPSRUWDQWKHUHZHSURSRVHLWWREHLQDSSURSULDWHWRZRUN
WRZDUGVDVLQJOHµEHVWSUDFWLFHDSSURDFK¶WRHQJDJHPHQWZLWKRXWDQDSSUHFLDWLRQRf the, sometimes 
significant, differing cultural and political circumstances and history of each nation under 
Finland United 
Kingdom 
Sweden Germany Bulgaria Spain Ukraine 
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FRQVLGHUDWLRQ,QGHHGDQDSSURDFKWRHQJDJHµHIIHFWLYHO\¶ZLWKSXEOLFVWDNHKROGHUVLQRQHFRXQWU\
may be inappropriate and ineffective in another. Linked to the notion of country-specific context, 
ZHDOVRFRQVLGHUWKHQRWLRQRIµSXEOLFV¶LQWKDWZHVHHNWRLGHQWLI\ZKHUHSRVVLEOHEHWZHHQZKRP
engagement has WDNHQSODFHDQGKRZWKLVKDVRFFXUUHGDQGKRZGLIIHUHQWµSXEOLFV¶KDYHDIIHFWHG
engagement in general. Rather, as the title of the report indicates, we seek to identify broad 
principles of engagement based on national historical experience which lead to societal benefit and 
democratic gain. We identify these principles more specifically in the following section. 
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5. Principles of Engagement: Criteria for Effective Stakeholder 
Engagement 
In reviewing  the historical experiences of the seven countries included in this report, it is clear that 
systems of energy governance leading to political influence has been significant in regards to the 
degree to which governments have engaged with their citizens. Whilst in some countries this has 
been minimal and has led to widespread public mistrust in both government and industry bodies, 
in others it has been more comprehensive, based on a commitment to democracy and building 
relationships with public stakeholders. If goals such as trust-building and developing solutions with 
widespread public support are to be pursued, it appears that politics and governments should 
reduce their dominant influence and enable public stakeholders to become more informed, and for 
SURFHVVHVWREHFRPHPRUHWUDQVSDUHQW7KH2(&'KDVVWDWHGWKDWDµODFNRINQRZOHGJH¶LV
a key driver of public concerns towards nuclear power. However, we argue that this persistent 
approach of the nuclear industry and many government bodies alike to quell the concerns of public 
stakeholders predominantly by scientific education, in order for them to build trust in experts and 
decision-makers and accept the proposals of these actors, is one which retains the priorities of 
experts at its centre and therefore cannot be sustainable within democratic systems. To continue 
WRIRFXVRQDFKLHYLQJSXEOLFDFFHSWDQFHDQGFRQVLVWHQWO\HQJDJHLQµGHOLEHUDWLYHVSHDN¶(Hindmarsh 
and Matthews 2008) without legitimate decision-making influence being afforded to public 
stakeholders, whilst failing to understand the needs, priorities and legitimate concerns of public 
stakeholders through deliberative dialogue, is to ignore the often inappropriate orientation of much 
historic public engagement on nuclear energy. 
 
As part of our principles of engagement, we propose that engagement reflects the lifespan of 
nuclear infrastructure and their occupancy of space within localities; that is, nuclear power stations 
continue to operate and exist among communities during numerous changes in national and local 
government. We argue that this would demonstrate an improved form of energy governance which 
is inherently more acknowledging of the nature and impact of such energy infrastructures. To 
govern such nationally significant infrastructure projects in a way which responds to political will 
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but not to the needs and priorities of those communities most directly affected by them is to mitigate 
any legitimate achievement of social justice and sustainable partnerships with local populations. 
Recent governance literature concurs with such assertions; Jordana (2017: 43) notes that ³PRVW
LQIUDVWUXFWXUH GHFLVLRQV KDYH WHPSRUDO LPSOLFDWLRQV EH\RQG HOHFWRUDO F\FOHV´, and that the 
stakeholders who benefit most from large infrastructural projects are different to the individuals who 
are impacted most greatly and must deal with the negative consequences of living close to them. 
In this context, stakeholder engagement programmes that function regardless of the political party 
in place at any given time would appear to demonstrate to public stakeholders a commitment to 
engagement and an indication of trustworthiness and long-term intentions. If such commitments 
are unable to be made, we argue that progress in regards to trust-building and confidence in 
sustainable industry engagement will be limited. 
 
The following section reflects upon and discusses the experiences of the seven country case 
studies, from which a set of principles for effective engagement is proposed. These are supported 
by country-specific examples of such principles and when these have been evident. 
 
5.1. Discussion of Country Experiences and Influence on Engagement 
Principles 
The experiences of the seven countries discussed in this report all inform in various ways the 
principles for effective engagement that we seek to develop. By combining academic and industry 
literature in what is discussed, reported and proposed regarding successful or effective 
engagement, and in conjunction with the lessons we can take from the history of engagement from 
each country, we look to develop principles which acknowledge the inevitable difference of each 
country, in regards to how engagement should be conceptualised, developed, and conducted, so 
that there may be constructive outcomes for botKWKHµRUJDQLVHUV¶RUµFRQYHQRUV¶RIHQJDJHPHQW
DQGIRUWKRVHµSDUWLFLSDQWV¶RIHQJDJHPHQWSURFHVVHVCultural context and other notable factors 
(see Calvano, 2008) must be recognised as playing a significant role in shaping and dictating the 
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extent to which engagement processes will integrate these or similar principles, and it is for this 
reason that at this stage, prior to the more detailed analysis of future work, we do not propose a 
conceptual framework of effective engagement within an idealised energy governance structure. 
Rather, we propose principles that promote fair procedures and maximised opportunity for dialogue 
and influence. As this report and the historical country reports on which it is based indicate, energy 
governance takes a multitude of forms, employs diverse approaches, and may deem some 
principles of greater importance than others. The principles we propose aim to be reflective of wider 
processes of effective governance, which encompass themes such as equity, respect, reciprocity, 
and opportunity. 
 
As we demonstrate in Figure 1, the seven countries we consider in this report have experienced - 
in some respects vastly - different experiences in regards to their interaction and relationship with 
nuclear energy and also the engagement associated with this interaction. There appears to be an 
identifiable experience divide between Western & Northern Europe (Germany, United Kingdom, 
Sweden, Finland) and Eastern & Southern European (Ukriane, Bulgaria, Spain) in regards to 
changes in political structures and regimes, and their influence on the engagement opportunities 
and access to information regarding nuclear energy developments and decision-making. The 
political response of several of the countries under consideration to negative events such as 
nuclear accidents is also an important factor when considering the scope and role of engagement 
activities. Between the 1950s and the 1990s, there were two nuclear accidents in Europe; the 
Windscale Fire in the UK and the Chernobyl accident in Ukraine (the accident at Three Mile Island 
in the United States in 1979 is also notable during this time period in a global context). Such events 
revealed the reluctance of the nuclear industry and political establishments at the time to inform 
their respective societies beyond the minimal level required, or in the case of Ukraine and Bulgaria, 
decided to produce false reports of the severity of the incident and risking the health and well-being 
of citizens. The cases demonstrate that in the mid to late-twentieth century, the seven countries 
considered in this report were engaged in varying but low levels of engagement, and operated 
SULPDULO\ RQ D µQHHG WR NQRZ¶ EDVLV ZKHUHE\ PRUH WKDQ NH\ LQIRUPDWLRQ SRLQWV ZHUH VHHQ DV
unnecessary to civil audiences or only likely to cause concern. In these cases a limited approach 
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to engagement sought to enable the industry and those in political power to operate without 
inducing societal panic whilst protecting their respective positions and futures. Whilst it may be 
argued that extensive engagement is not always required or demanded by a given society, 
opportunities for engagement, should it be deemed necessary or appropriate and demanded by 
those societies, should be present and able to be utilised effectively. 
 
For countries such as Spain, operating under the dictatorship of General Franco until the mid-
1970s, citizen engagement was considered unnecessary at any level. Today, support for nuclear 
power in Spain remains lower than countries such as the UK and Finland, where engagement has 
been more prevalent. This contrasts with countries such as Germany, which have operated within 
a democratic system for far longer than Spain and have enjoyed the democratic freedoms that 
come with such structures of government. The result of this more democratic structure is the 
opportunity for German citizens to demonstrate against an industry which many believe, and have 
done for many decades, is too dangerous to continue in the context of national energy generation, 
in addition to continued associations with the development of weapons for nuclear warfare. Such 
experiences demonstrate that whilst engagement is promoted as the most likely method to garner 
support and mitigate opposition, it is not a guarantee for ensuring public acceptance. The persistent 
violence and protest action against nuclear power development in Germany serves as an example 
of some of the most sizeable and vehement opposition movements to any energy technology, and 
these have accumulated in a national moratorium against further nuclear power-related 
development in the country.  
 
7KHPRUHµRSHQ¶DQGLQWHJUDWHGQDWXUHRIQXFOHDUHQJDJHPHQWLQFRXQWULHVVXFKDV*HUPDQ\WKH
UK, Sweden and Finland has seen different results, which in-part reflects the cultural and political 
nature of each case and highlights the need for further analysis of these differing socio-political 
contexts. Despite facing different futures in regards to nuclear expansion and development, both 
Sweden and Finland appear to demonstrate a culturally-driven respect for and trust in experts and 
specialists such as engineers and industry personnel, which may have played a significant role in 
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pre-empting the protest activity seen in Germany. The nuclear industry in both Sweden and Finland 
can also be seen to have incorporated public and stakeholder engagement into their site-specific 
operations for many years, and public referenda such as that held in Sweden in the late 1970s on 
the future of nuclear reflect a liberal and democratic approach employed many decades ago. 
Although it may be argued that the UK does not share the same degree of trust in scientists and 
engineers as its Scandinavian counterparts to operate in the best interests of local and wider 
society, it has demonstrated throughout its history episodes of positive if not ideal engagement, 
such as the Sizewell B Public Inquiry in the 1980s and a large-scale public consultation on a 
geological disposal facility in Cumbria in 2012-14. More recently there have been calls from the UK 
nuclear industry to refocus on stakeholder engagement and employ more dialogue-based 
approaches to communication efforts (NIC, 2015). 
 
In response to that which we have examined and discussed ± both the experiences of engagement 
detailed in the literature and detailed country reports ± we now return to the identification of 
principles for effective engagement. These combined accounts of historical examples of 
engagement approaches enable us to reflect upon and develop the initial set of principles in Table 
1, and present a set of principles for effective engagement in Table 2, which will inform future work 
as part of this project. 
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Principle Summary of Principle 
European examples 
(support and oppose 
principle assertions) 
Timely engagement 
(QJDJHZLWKVWDNHKROGHUVµXS-VWUHDP¶Dnd 
prior to key decision-making periods to 
legitimise engagement and stakeholder 
input 
Sweden and Finland ± site-related 
decision-making (common practice) 
 
United Kingdom ± 2008 White Paper 
on Nuclear Power public 
consultations, public responses 
seen to influence White Paper, 
whilst environmental groups deemed 
process biased and decisions pre-
determined 
Dialogue-based 
engagement 
Information provision and expert-to-
stakeholder communication alone is often 
inappropriate and insufficient. A dialogue-
based approach enables both parties to 
explore issues and decisions, and also 
understand stakeholder values and 
priorities. This is not to discourage the 
SURYLVLRQRIµSURMHFWXSGDWHV¶HQWLUHO\EXWWR
utilise more direct than indirect 
communication 
United Kingdom ± public 
consultation on geological repository 
site selection in Cumbria (2012); 
2008 White Paper on Nuclear Power 
public consultations 
Wide and objective 
engagement 
Engage with a range of stakeholders and 
understand the positions and needs of 
various stakeholders, absent of bias or 
subjectivity. This is important for reasons of 
democracy, equity and procedural justice. 
 
Sweden ± national advisory 
referendum on the future of nuclear 
power (1979) 
 
United Kingdom - 2008 White Paper 
on Nuclear Power public 
consultations, seen as valid period 
of public consultation by some and 
biased process based on pre-
determined outcomes by some 
groups 
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Ukraine, Bulgaria and Spain ± lack 
of societal engagement for many 
decades has resulted in the growth 
of environmental and nuclear 
opposition groups, protests and 
direct action  
Open and 
transparent 
procedures 
If processes of engagement are limited, if 
dialogue is restricted, or if those involved 
are unwilling to discuss important issues, 
constructive outcomes and shared learning 
are less likely to occur 
 
(Greater transparency) 
 
Sweden ± national advisory 
referendum on the future of nuclear 
power (1979) 
 
United Kingdom ± Sizewell B NPP 
public inquiry (1982-1985), 
Trawsfynnydd NPP 
decommissioning proposals (1994, 
Bond et al., 2004) 
 
(Less transparency) 
 
Germany ± protests by local farmers 
to local site development proposals 
Spain ± low levels of trust persistent 
from times of authoritarian regime 
(until mid-1970s) 
 
Spain ± social movements of 
opposition (1970s/1990s/2000s) 
following fall of dictatorship, where 
public engagement was very limited 
 
Ukraine and Bulgaria ± distrust 
among citizens as a result of 
industry and governmental 
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responses to Chernobyl accident 
(1986 onwards) 
 
Finland and Sweden ± long tradition 
of engaging with local communities, 
trust in experts and scientists if 
relatively high (common practice) 
 
Context 
dependency 
Engagement structure and content should 
be in-part determined by stakeholders, so as 
to validate topics under discussion and to 
address issues of greatest concern for all 
parties. Understanding the specific context 
of each community or group facilitates more 
effective engagement and decision-making. 
United Kingdom ± public 
consultation on geological repository 
site selection in Cumbria (MRWS, 
2012) 
 
Spain ± social movement of 
opposition specifically associated 
with Basque country (µThe 
Committee for the Defence of a No 
Nuclear Basque Coast¶ (CDCVNN) 
formalized in May 1976)  
 
 
Extra-political 
engagement 
The impacts of infrastructure decisions often 
exceed political timescales and terms of 
office, and affect local stakeholders to a 
greater degree than those in decision-
making positions. It is recommended that 
stakeholder engagement is not excessively 
influenced by political timescales and the 
intentions of changing political parties. 
United Kingdom ± Trawsfynnydd 
NPP decommissioning proposals 
(1994, Bond et al., 2004) 
Procedural justice 
Fair, inclusive, accessible and well-
conducted procedures can be as important 
as decision outcomes themselves. If 
procedures are seen to be conducted fairly, 
then resulting decisions, whilst not being 
explicitly supported, may be accepted by 
stakeholders 
United Kingdom ± Sizewell B public 
inquiry, utilisation of various 
methods of engagement and 
collection of information (1982-
1985); 2008 White Paper public 
consultations, national consultation 
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period which influenced nuclear 
documentation 
 
Sweden ± national advisory 
referendum on the future of nuclear 
power (1979) 
Access to 
engagement 
processes 
All social groups and interest-based 
organisations should have the opportunity to 
participate in processes of engagement, as 
a range of views and knowledge are 
necessary for effective and legitimate 
decision-making. This is also important to 
ensure procedural justice and socially just 
decision-making. 
United Kingdom - 2008 White Paper 
on Nuclear Power public 
consultations, a range of groups 
were invited to participate 
 
Sweden ± national advisory 
referendum on the future of nuclear 
power (1979), inclusive of all 
Swedish citizens wishing to 
participate 
Access to 
information and 
individuals 
Without access to the full range of 
information to make informed decisions, or 
access to officials, experts and decision-
makers to ask questions, engage in 
deliberation or voice concerns, engagement 
will not meet the demands of democracy or 
social justice 
Ukraine, Bulgaria and Spain ± little 
information provided to members of 
the public, understanding of nuclear 
power and impacts was low during 
authoritarian and communist 
regimes, environmental groups and 
movements brought about periods of 
significant education and learning on 
the nuclear topic through public 
lectures and campaigning 
Reciprocity 
All parties involved in processes of 
engagement must benefit in a tangible and 
legitimate way 
United Kingdom - Trawsfynnydd 
NPP decommissioning proposals 
(1994; Bond et al., 2004) 
 
Table 2. Principles for Effective Engagement 
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The authors have sought to understand the principles and values that are required in order to 
ensure that engagement is fair, equitable, and ultimately effective, whether this be through 
impacting policy or practice; a more detailed analysis of engagement on country-specific policy or 
practice is a central part of our future work. We have reviewed several country reports to identify 
examples of historical nuclear power-related engagement and have detailed the lessons provided 
by them in regards to conceptualising engagement principles which can be utilised by the nuclear 
industry, and others, to ensure that public and stakeholder engagement processes are constructive 
for all those involved. Engagement steered by such principles should provide opportunities for 
participants of engagement to both express matters of concern and priority, and share knowledge 
and experience with other parties. We find that our discussion on principles for effective 
engagement naturally sits within a broader discussion on energy governance and how this should 
be both conceptualised and executed within different cultural and political contexts. 
 
The principles of effective engagement presented in Table 2 highlight the different historical 
experiences of countries across Europe, and reveal the pitfalls and opportunities in either restricting 
or promoting engagement respectively. For a topic as significant as nuclear on local, national and 
international scales, adhering or at least taking from these principles can assist in mitigating social 
LQMXVWLFHVDQG WKUHDWV WRGHPRFUDF\ZKLFKDUHDOO WRRHYLGHQW LQ(XURSH¶VKLVWRU\SDUWLFXODUO\ LQ
regards to national energy policy and the political complexity associated with it. In conjunction with 
RWKHU ZRUN WKDW DWWHPSWV WR IRUPXODWH D VHULHV RI FULWLFDO FULWHULD IRU HQVXULQJ µVXFFHVV¶ GXULQJ
engagement with citizens or impacted communities, we argue that future processes of engagement 
should utilise the lessons of history to enhance the communicative and interactional processes of 
the future, whether in Europe or further afield.     
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